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1 Introduction 
 
Along with the share-split reform, many Chinese 
companies took segmental listing (Wu, 2004) and 
some of them spin off high-quality assets for 
segmental listing so as to satisfy the regulations of 
China Securities Regulatory Commission
1
. After the 
reform in 2006
2
, an increasing number of major 
shareholders injected their unlisted assets into the 
listed companies in Chinese Security Markets. From 
the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2012, there were 
3871 times of injection of assets and the total figure in 
monetary term was amounted to 1194.477 billion 
RMB. This phenomenon is unique to China Securities 
Market because "spin-off" does rarely exist in other 
countries. Therefore there have rarely been 
acquisitions of the unlisted assets that belong to the 
major shareholders. Some studies have been done in 
the controlling shareholders’ "tunneling" phenomena 
in the Hong Kong (Cheung et al., 2006) and Korean 
                                                          
1
 At the early establish stage of China Securities Market, the 
listed companies can issue current stock and noncurrent 
stock. They have different trade right makes the idea of share 
split. In order to solve the problem of split share, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission starts the split share 
structure reform in 2006. The reform is on the basis of 
compensation to tradable shareholders, to allow non-tradable 
shares trading in the stock market.  
2
 At present, it only allows qualified foreign investors to buy 
shares of China stock market. 
listed companies (Bae et al., 2002) within the Group 
merger and acquisition activities. There is little 
literature on the acquisition of major shareholders’ 
unlisted assets in other countries. The reason for the 
lack of research effort in this area may be because that 
the Chinese stock market has not yet been fully open 
to foreign investors. As a result, international scholars 
pay little attention to the assets injection problem in 
China. 
Although there is limited international literature 
in this research area, there are quite a few Chinese 
literature on why the major shareholders are 
enthusiastic about inject their unlisted asset in Chinese 
listed companies. Huang and Yin (2008), Zhu and 
Zhang (2010) suggest that，after the share-split 
reform, the largest shareholders shares can be traded 
in stock market. Consequently, the assets injection 
makes the assets value increase, and the increased 
profits induce more major shareholders to inject assets 
in listed companies in China. Some researchers argue 
that the injection of assets can lead to integration, 
promotion a complete industrial chain, and creation of 
synergies as well (Liu et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2010). 
However, the mainstream argument is major 
shareholders are using assets injection to “tunneling”. 
“Spin-off” effect cuts off the industrial chain of listed 
companies and conglomerates, which results in more 
related party transactions (Zhang and Guo, 2008; Ji et 
al., 2010; Zhang and Li, 2010). 
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Although these studies analyzed different angles 
of major shareholders’ assets injection in China, these 
studies do not distinguish between the various 
different controlling shareholder categories. 
Moreover, there is no analysis and testing of the 
problem that how assets’ injection impact on the long-
term shareholders’ wealth and operating performance 
among different controlling shareholder categories. 
After the Southeast Asia financial crisis, highly 
concentrated shareholding has resulted in controlling 
shareholders’ plundering behaviors on small 
shareholders. Different from diverse shareholding in 
the US and the UK listed companies, there’s generally 
one controlling shareholder in China (Li et al., 2005). 
Many research indicates, when there is one controlling 
shareholder, the Free Rider Problem would be 
resolved at some extent. However there will be more 
profit conflicts between the controlling shareholders 
and the non-controlling shareholders than that 
between the management and the non-controlling 
shareholders in corporate governance (La Porta et al., 
1999；Faccio & Lang，2002；Claessens et al., 
2002). The controlling shareholders could utilize 
related party transactions to transfer companies’ assets 
so as to maximize profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997
；La Porta et al., 1998；Johnson et al., 2000; Liu et 
al., 2004; Li et al., 2005). 
Hence, related party transaction is a major 
approach that the controlling shareholders utilize to 
transfer the assets of listed companies. Chinese listed 
companies issue private placement of equity (PPE) to 
buy assets from major shareholders. PPE is regarded 
as a large-scale related party transaction. The question 
is, whether the controlling shareholders are 
"tunneling" from the related party transactions? If so, 
what is the impact of the largest shareholders’ 
"tunneling" on the performance of listed companies? 
The equity structure in China listed company is 
similar to these in Europe and Southeast Asia (Bai et 
al., 2005). The China listed company has one 
controlling shareholder that is distinguished by state-
holding and private-holding. Different shareholding 
lead to different profit goals. For private-owned listed 
companies, the goal of the controlling shareholder is 
to maximize self-interests. As for state-owned listed 
company, the goal of the controlling shareholder is to 
pursue political objectives (Bai et al, 2005; Cheng et 
al., 2008). Studies have shown that, in order to adhere 
to the Government's policy (employment, social 
pension, social stability and social objectives) and to 
achieve government officials’ political promotion 
goals
3
, the Government officials may intervene the 
state-owned listed companies’ operating activities 
(Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang，2008；
Ferguson and Voth，2008；Li and Zhu, 2006; Wu et 
                                                          
3
 Economic performance indicators become the selection and 
promotion standards for local officials in China than pure 
political indicators. The economic performance indicators 
include local GDP growth, the local fiscal revenue growth and 
employment indicators etc (Liu, 2005). 
al., 2008; Wang and Wu, 2008). In addition, the 
performance of state-owned listed companies will 
decline because of the intervention from the 
government officials (Shleifer and Vishny，1994；
Fan et al.，2007；Xu and Lv, 2007; Pan et al., 2008; 
Deng and Zeng, 2009). This paper aims to examine 
whether there are difference between controlling 
shareholders of the above two types in the "tunneling" 
effect? And what are the impacts of the controlling 
shareholders’ behaviors on shareholder’s wealth and 
the company's performance? 
In this paper, we investigate the Private 
Placement of Equity (PPE) by asset injection between 
2006 and 2007 in China, and we analyze the 
influences of the asset injection on the shareholders’ 
wealth and performance in state-holding listed 
companies and private-holding listed companies. 
Some of the main findings of this paper include: 
First, when related party’s asset injection occurs in a 
listed company, shareholders’ short-term wealth will 
increase. However their long-term wealth and the 
whole company’s business performance will not be 
significantly improved. Second, PPE by asset-
injection of the state-owned company displays 
substantially regressive reaction than private-owned 
company on shareholders wealth and operating 
performance. 
The contributions of this research are: First, this 
paper makes a new interpretation of asset injection 
phenomena from the perspective of agency theory. 
Second, the findings of this research expand the use of 
agency theory in controlling shareholders and non-
controlling shareholders from the perspective of 
corporate governance of listed corporations. Third, the 
study enriches the literature of assets injection of 
listed companies in the emerging securities market. In 
particular, a special attention on different types of 
controlling shareholders could enhance the 
understanding of the relationship between the 
government and enterprises in transitional economies. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: 
The second section is a literature review and 
theoretical hypothesis, and it is followed by the third 
section, which is data and methodology. The fourth 
section provides the empirical results. The last section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2 Literature review and theoretical 
hypotheses 
 
Since the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, more 
attention has been paid to controlling shareholders’ 
plundering behavior on small shareholders through 
tunneling. From the global perspective, ownership 
structures of listed companies are relatively 
concentrated in most countries, except those in Britain 
and America. In those countries which have 
concentrated corporate ownership structures, 
controlling shareholders commonly exist (Shleifer and 
Vishny，1997；La Porta et al，1999，2002；
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Claessens et al，2000，2002；Bae et al.，2002). 
Among British and American listed companies, due to 
a deconcentration of ownership structures 
managements were able to pursue their benefits and 
harmed shareholders’ interests with fewer restraints. 
The Enron case reveals the ‘insider control’ problem 
resulting from deconcentrated ownership structures 
completely. However, as a mechanism which remits 
the agency problem between shareholders and 
management, the existence of controlling shareholders 
not only plays a positive role on corporate governance, 
but also derives another agency problem. Controlling 
shareholders could favor themselves through their 
power and rights of control over companies, whereas 
non-controlling shareholders cannot share those 
benefits. As a result their interests are inevitably 
harmed. The agency problem above is particularly 
obvious in those countries in which the legal system 
and the investor-protection mechanism are unsound, 
such as Mainland China and countries in Southeast 
Asia. (Faccio et al., 2001；La Porta et al.，2002；
Bai et al., 2005). Therefore, controlling shareholders 
may harm non-controlling shareholders’ interests in 
the case of a relatively concentrated ownership 
structure. 
Controlling shareholders can harm non-
controlling shareholders’ interests through tunneling 
in two approaches. One approach is self-dealing 
transaction, in which controlling shareholders can 
transfer resources of companies and seek for their own 
interests (Jian and Wong, 2004). Typical self-dealing 
transactions are theft and fraud, trading of assets, 
transfer pricing, excessive management compensation, 
loan guarantee, occupation of investment 
opportunities and so on. The other approach is 
discriminatory treatment on non-controlling 
shareholders, in which controlling shareholders are 
able to achieve the ultimate objective of maximizing 
self-interests (Jian and Wong, 2004). Such 
discriminatory treatments include dilutive share 
issues, minority freezeouts, insider trading, creeping 
acquisitions and other financial trading.  
A highly concentrated ownership is prevailing 
among Chinese listed companies (Wu, 2004). Among 
those companies, the holding percentage of controlling 
shareholders is more than 54 percent in average (Xu et 
al., 2006). Many researchers find that controlling 
shareholders have incentives to tunnel listed 
companies by means of asset appraisal (Zhou et al., 
2003), self-dealing transaction (Jian and Wong, 2004) 
and occupation of capital (Li et al., 2004). Related 
party asset injection in Chinese listed companies is a 
large-scale self-dealing transaction between 
companies and their controlling shareholders (Li et al., 
2004). Since Chinese legal system is not well 
established and still has lots of room for improvement, 
the asset injection of listed companies is mainly 
reviewed and overlooked by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Wu, 2004). Under 
such an institutional background, controlling 
shareholders of Chinese listed companies have 
incentives to gain private benefits through asset 
injection among related parties. There are several 
ways to realize those incentives. For example, 
controlling shareholders can inject low-quality assets 
into the listed companies (Li et al., 2004) or 
overestimate values of assets injected by asset 
appraisal (Zhou et al., 2003). Besides, they can also 
manipulate considerations of assets injected, in order 
to exchange more shares (Zhang, 2010). Tunneling 
behaviors above could lower the quality of assets, and 
even affect the going concern of listed companies and 
thus harm shareholders’ wealth (Zhang and Li, 2010). 
When carying on related party’s asset injection, 
Chinese listed companies often claim in their 
announcements that assets injected are all high quality 
assets from large shareholders. Furthermore, they 
claim that the asset injection could extend the 
industrial chain of companies, reduce horizontal 
competitions, decrease self-dealing transactions, lower 
transaction costs and produce synergies (Zhou et al., 
2003; Liu et al., 2011). Based on the announcements, 
the non-controlling shareholders could estimate that 
corporate performance could be improved by asset 
injection. As a result, they may hold or purchase more 
of their companies’ outstanding shares. This will 
result in a short-term stock rise of those asset-injected 
listed companies. However, whether there will be any 
long-term increase in shareholders’ wealth is a 
question that this paper seeks to explore.  
Based on the analysis above, we come up with 
the first theoretical hypothesis as below: 
Hypothesis 1: When related party asset injection 
occurs in a listed company, shareholders’ short-term 
wealth can be increased, but shareholders’ long-term 
wealth and the entire company’s business 
performance will not be significantly improved. 
As we mention above, similar to the listed 
companies in Europe and Southeast Asia, controlling 
shareholders exist in the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies (Faccio et al., 2002; La 
Porta et al., 1999). According to the nature of 
shareholders, Chinese listed companied can be 
classified into two types: state-holding and private-
holding listed companies. In the private-holding listed 
companies, controlling shareholders seek 
maximization of personal interests, whereas in the 
state-holding listed companies, government officials’ 
political goals are the most imperative objectives 
(Zhou, 2004; Zhou, 2007).  
Those political goals can be divided into two 
types: (1) resolving the problem of government policy 
burden (Lin and Li, 2004; Pan et al., 2008). In the 
process of transitioning from planned economy to 
market economy, the power structure of Chinese 
government has been moved from centralization to 
decentralization. In this process, the local government 
has obtained or gained financial autonomy and 
economic administration power (Zhou, 2007). At the 
same time, the local government also burdens a lot of 
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social objectives, such as employment rate, social 
pension and social stabilization (Lin and Li, 2004; 
Cheng et al., 2008). To resolve those policy burdens, 
the local government has incentive to provide deficit 
local state-holding listed companies with financial 
subsidies and to require the profitable local firms to 
acquire those that suffer from heavy losses (Pan et al., 
2008). (2) Political promotion for local government 
officials. Since the 1980s, the standards for selecting 
and promoting local government officials have been 
replaced by economic performance measures, 
including the local GDP growth, the local fiscal 
revenue growth and employment measures. This kind 
of performance measurement mechanism leads to 
‘competitions for promotion’ among officials (Qian 
and Xu，1993；Maskin et al.，2000；Blanchard and 
Shleifer，2001；Zhou，2004，2007). To increase 
the local GDP, it is possible that the local government 
has a strong incentive to expand the size of the 
government-related listed companies by means of 
asset injection and place efficiency on ‘backseat’ 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994；Fan et al.，2007；Xu 
and Lv，2007；Pan et al.，2008；Deng and Zeng，
2009). Such ‘arbitrarily arranged’ acquisitions through 
asset injection are indications of the local 
government’s political goals and personal interests. 
Such acquisitions make very little contributions to a 
constant improvement of corporate performance (Li et 
al., 2005) and cannot lead to an achievement of 
competitive advantages (Song and Zhou, 2007). 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the state-holding 
listed companies’ business performance may decrease 
and shareholders’ wealth may also be harmed because 
of the asset injections under the government’s 
intervention. 
Based on the analysis above, we come up with 
the second theoretical hypothesis as below: 
Hypothesis 2: Compared with private-holding 
listed companies, after asset injection, state holding 
listed companies experience larger reduction in 
shareholders’ long-term interests and companies’ 
business performance.  
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data Description 
 
Through GTA CSMAR Solution search, we identify 
446 PEP (Private Equity Placement) asset-injections 
with affiliated investors from the January 2006 to 
December 2007 period by firms that listed Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) and ShenZhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). We exclude the sample firms on six aspects, 
i. firms issue B share, 
ii. firms issue H share, 
iii. firms are titled ST (Special Treatment) or titled 
PT (Particular Transfer),  
iv. firms ultimate control are unknown, 
v. firms financial data and financial transaction 
data are unknown, 
vi. firms financial index data abnormal. 
 
3.2 Model Design and Variable Definition 
 
We test the asset injection effects using the following 
multiple regression model: 
 
    (1) 
 
     (2) 
 
CAR/BHAR/ROE are explained variables, 
Inject/Lev/Gov/Size/Share/Q are the explanatory 
variables andγ/λ are random disturbance terms. 
Inject=the scale of asset injection/the total asset at the 
end of the year before announcement; Gov=the 
government control variable, we defined Gov=1 as 
firm ultimate control is government and Gov=0 for the 
others; Lev= asset-liability ratio at the end of the year 
before announcement; Size=ln (the total asset at the 
end of the year before announcement); Share=the first 
majority shareholder shareholding ratio at the end of 
the year before announcement; Q=Tobin's Q at the end 
of the year before announcement.  
The cumulative abnormal return (CARi) for firm 
i on T (time period) is defined as follows: 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
Rit is the daily returns for firm i on day t; Rmt is 
return of the market index which firm i listing on day 
t; Pit is the closing price for firm i on day t; Pit-1 is the 
closing price for firm i on day t-1; Pmt is the close 
index which firm i listing on day t; Pmt-1 is the close 
index which firm i listing on day t-1. 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return BHARi for 
stock i over the period T is defined as follow: 
  QShareSizeLevInjectGovInjectROEBHARCAR 6543210 * //
  QShareSizeLevInjectGovInjectGovROEBHARCAR 76543210 *//
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 (5) 
 
 is the return for firm i on month t;  
is the market return on month t. 
The estimation window is [−5, +25], with day 0 
being the announcement. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
 
4.1 The performance analysis of asset-
injecting with full size sample 
 
Table 1 shows the regression results of asset-injecting 
performance with full sample size. The influence of 
the asset injection to public firms’ performance is 
positive and statistically significant in the short-term. 
Over the [-5, +25] period, each unit of asset injection 
improves 0.175 units of corporate performance; Over 
the [-1, +1] period, each unit of asset injection 
improves 0.088 units of corporate performance. In the 
long-term, the asset-injecting scale of listed company 
does not influence firms’ performance significant 
statistically. The asset injection is not statistically 
significant with BHAR36 and ROE, which proves 
Hypothesis 1. We can tell that the asset-injecting 
performance of state-owned listed companies are 
much poorer than private listed companies during 
short-term investigation and long-term investigation 
by the statistic of significant minus (Inject*Gov) in all 
regression. The result confirms the Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 1. Full sample size regression 
 
 CAR[-5,+25] Car[-1,1] BHAR36 ROE 
C -0.032 
（-0.156） 
-0.202** 
（-2.521） 
3.286** 
（2.466） 
-0.584** 
（-2.522） 
 0.175** 
（1.983） 
0.088*** 
（2.571） 
-0.747 
（-1.293） 
0.109 
（1.084） 
*  -0.064*** 
（-2.830） 
-0.022** 
（-2.531） 
-0.328** 
（-2.227） 
-0.073*** 
（-2.848） 
 0.000 
（0.707） 
0.000** 
（1.968） 
0.000 
（0.084） 
0.000 
（-1.046） 
 0.000 
（0.004） 
0.004 
（1.240） 
-0.127** 
（-2.235） 
0.025** 
（2.484） 
 -0.042* 
（-1.862） 
0.026*** 
（2.946） 
-0.216 
（-1.444） 
0.081*** 
（3.116） 
 -0.101* 
（-1.898） 
0.012 
（0.602） 
0.110 
（0.315） 
0.012 
（0.197） 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.036 0.025 0.040 
F-test 2.880*** 3.788*** 2.754** 3.905*** 
Note: BHAR36 refers to study period for 36 months of buy and hold abnormal return. CAR [-5, +25] is the 
cumulative abnormal return over interval from day -5 to day +25. Car [-1,+1] is the cumulative abnormal return 
over interval from day -1 to day +1. *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level;** Statistical significance at the 
0.05 level;* Statistical significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
As shown in Table 1, due to the different 
dependent variable index, there are differences in the 
regression results with different control variables 
index. For the company size index (Size), there is no 
influence to short-term market performance while 
there are negative influences to long-term market 
performance and positive influences to financial 
performance significantly. In general, there are 
different influences between control variable and 
explained variables with different index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Part sample short-term market 
performance (CAR) analysis 
 
4.2.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the AAR, CAAR and independent 
sample T-test statistic of China state-holding listed 
companies and private-holding listed companies 
affiliate asset-injecting by PEP over [-5, +25] period 
between 2006 and 2007. We can tell that there is 
generally very little difference of AAR between state-
holding listed companies and private-holding listed 
companies except on day -1, day 5, day 13 and day 21 
(which exhibit significant differences). Most state-
holding listed firms’ AAR are negative after the 
announcement day. This result is consistent with the 
argument of Li et al. (2005) and Pan et al. (2008). 
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Table 2. The average abnormal return, cumulative average abnormal return and t-statistic of 
state-holding and private-holding listed companies over [-5,+25] period 
 
Event Day 
Private- 
holding 
AAR（%） 
State- 
holding AAR
（%） 
T- 
statistic 
Event 
Day 
Private- 
holding 
CAAR  
（%） 
State- 
holding 
CAAR 
（%） 
T- statistic 
（-5） 0.14 0.02 -0.494 （-5） 0.14 -0.01 -0.494 
（-4） -0.05 0.11 0.759 （-4） 0.09 0.18 0.211 
（-3） 0.38 -0.10 -1.396 （-3） 0.47 0.10 -0.606 
（-2） 0.50 0.15 -0.439 （-2） 0.96 0.42 -0.775 
（-1） 1.14 0.37 -2.134** （-1） 2.11 0.75 -1.752* 
0 0.31 0.13 -0.497 0 2.41 0.86 -1.844* 
1 0.33 0.14 -0.704 1 2.74 0.89 -1.817* 
2 0.04 0.03 -0.257 2 2.78 0.83 -1.723* 
3 -0.19 -0.28 -0.28 3 2.58 0.55 -1.702* 
4 -0.12 0.10 0.674 4 2.46 0.64 -1.505 
5 0.36 -0.35 -2.263** 5 2.82 0.34 -1.965** 
6 0.26 0.03 -0.755 6 3.08 0.36 -2.1** 
7 -0.02 -0.13 -0.389 7 3.06 0.21 -2.165** 
8 -0.18 -0.07 0.562 8 2.88 0.21 -1.956* 
9 -0.07 -0.51 -1.075 9 2.81 -0.22 -2.193** 
10 -0.25 -0.02 0.574 10 2.56 -0.29 -2.002** 
11 -0.01 0.13 0.371 11 2.54 -0.17 -1.877* 
12 -0.23 -0.14 0.641 12 2.31 -0.18 -1.708* 
13 0.39 -0.39 -2.094** 13 2.71 -0.49 -2.095** 
14 0.26 -0.16 -1.136 14 2.96 -0.61 -2.231** 
15 -0.35 -0.09 0.507 15 2.62 -0.80 -2.076** 
16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.191 16 2.56 -0.92 -2.092** 
17 0.24 -0.06 -1.182 17 2.80 -1.08 -2.237** 
18 -0.27 -0.22 0.351 18 2.53 -1.24 -2.136** 
19 -0.08 -0.24 -0.514 19 2.45 -1.47 -2.21** 
20 -0.18 -0.45 -0.846 20 2.28 -1.91 -2.342** 
21 0.20 -0.55 -2.125** 21 2.48 -2.39 -2.666*** 
22 -0.46 -0.35 0.606 22 2.02 -2.67 -2.531** 
23 -0.18 -0.19 -0.277 23 1.84 -2.94 -2.555** 
24 -0.27 -0.17 0.391 24 1.57 -3.08 -2.43** 
25 0.08 0.17 0.236 25 1.65 -2.93 -2.38** 
Note: *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.05 level; * statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level 
 
Figure 1. Asset-injecting CAAR tendency chart of state-holding and 
 private-holding listed companies in event window 
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4.2.2 Multiple regression analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the short-term market performance 
regression result of the sample firms after asset-
injecting. The Gov variable is negative in all sets of 
regression, which confirms Hypothesis 2: the 
operating performances of private-holding listed 
companies are better than state-holding listed 
companies after asset-injecting announcement. The 
negative performance of state-holding listed 
companies after the announcement could be explained 
by “government robbery” in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998). As shown in Table 3, the Inject variable 
presents a positive impact on shareholders’ wealth for 
the [1，-1] period significantly, but has less influence 
on market performance for the [-5,+25] period. As the 
test result of the cross term Inject*Gov is negative in 
all sets of regression, compared with private-holding 
listed companies, the asset-injecting of state-holding 
listed companies cannot enhance their short-term 
market performance and even make it worse. We can 
conclude that the regression results of Table 3 support 
the Hypothesis 2 and are consistent with the argument 
of Pan et al (2008). 
 
 
Table 3. The short-term market performance regression 
 
 Car[-5,25] Car[-5,25] CAR[-5,25] Car[-1,1] Car[-1,1] CAR[-1,1] 
C 0.148 
(0.809) 
0.006 
(0.030) 
0.161 
(0.880) 
-0.109 
(-1.539) 
-0.186** 
(-1.823) 
-0.105 
(-1.475) 
 -0.051*** 
(-2.769) 
-0.051*** 
(-2.742) 
 -0.017** 
(-2.396) 
-0.017** 
(-2.362) 
 
  0.136 
(1.562) 
  0.074** 
(2.205) 
 
*    -0.059*** 
(-2.601) 
  -0.019** 
(-2.222) 
 0.001 
(0.910) 
0.000 
(0.752) 
0.001 
(0.846) 
0.001** 
(2.258) 
0.000** 
(2.036) 
0.001** 
(2.141) 
 -0.002 
(-0.232) 
0.000 
(-0.049) 
-0.009 
(-0.305) 
0.003 
(0.910) 
0.004 
(1.164) 
0.003 
(0.848) 
 -0.043* 
(-1.888) 
-0.043* 
(-0.092) 
-0.043* 
(-1.871) 
0.026*** 
(2.911) 
0.026*** 
(2.939) 
0.026*** 
(2.906) 
 -0.098* 
(-1.848) 
-0.097* 
(-1.831) 
-0.101* 
(-1.892) 
0.013 
(0.623) 
0.013 
(0.654) 
0.012 
(0.559) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.020 0.023 0.018 0.026 0.035 0.024 
F-statistic 2.836** 2.778** 2.652** 3.838*** 3.677*** 3.183*** 
Note: *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.05 level; * statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level 
 
As shown in Table 3, because of the different 
event window, control variables of the regression 
results are different. The growth of listed companies (
) before announcement have a negative impact on 
the short-term market performance over [-5, +25] 
period significantly, however ( ) has a positive 
influence on the short-term market performance over 
[-1, +1] period. The financial leverage (Lev) before 
announcement shows significant negative influences 
on short-term market performance over [-5, +25] 
period but demonstrates a not so significant influence 
over [-1, +1] period. However, the first majority 
shareholder shareholding ratio (Share) and short-term 
market performance share the same positive tendency 
over [-1, +1] period significantly while insignificantly 
over [-5, +25] period. We also find the firm size (Size) 
is not significant in all event window which means 
there is no influence between the firm size and short-
term market performance during investigation. 
 
4.3 Part sample long-term performance 
test 
 
4.3.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Figure 2 reveals the BHAR of listed firm which have 
private placing asset-injection over a 3 year period 
between 2006 and 2007. The graph shows that the 
state-owned listed firms BHAR are negative and keep 
decreasing over 36 months. For the private-holding 
listed firms BHAR, it fluctuate slightly roughly 
positive before month 18 and keep negative dropping 
to below -20% on month 30, then it decreases till 
month 36 after 3 months’ upwards movements. 
Compared state-holding listed firms BHAR with 
private-holding listed firms BHAR, the latter performs 
much better than the former and the maximum gap 
between them widen to 31.89% on month 36. Hence, 
after announcement the private-holding listed firms 
experiences a long-term decline in shareholders’ 
wealth. The state-holding listed firms’ shareholders’ 
wealth drop even more than these in the private-
Gov
Inject
Inject Gov
Share
Size
Q
Lev
Q
Q
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holding listed firms. The conclusion further supports 
the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. BHAR after announcement 
 
 
 
Table 4. The long-term performance test 
 
 BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 ROA ROE 
State-holding 
Mean  
-0.0909* 
（-1.955） 
-0.2478*** 
（-6.201） 
-0.5499*** 
（-8.841） 
0.0387*** 
(12.962) 
0.0606*** 
(15.345) 
Private-holding 
Mean 
-0.0387 
（-0.703） 
-0.1311* 
（-1.727） 
-0.2197** 
（-2.122） 
0.0543*** 
(10.080) 
0.1328*** 
(3.666) 
T-test 
statistic 
-0.05213 
（-0.726） 
-0.11666 
（-1.454） 
-0.33020*** 
（-2.876） 
-0.01557*** 
(-2.721) 
-0.07219*** 
(-4.029) 
Note: *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.05 level;        * 
statistical significance at the 0.10 level 
 
In order to further examine the difference 
between state-holding listed firm and private-holding 
listed firm, we divide the sample into two subsamples, 
sample A includes state-holding listed firms and 
sample B includes private-holding listed firms. Table 
4 shows the subsamples test results of BHAR12, 
BHAR24, BHAR36, ROA and ROE. With the 
increasing span of time, the BHAR difference between 
subsamples becomes more obvious. In month 12, 
mean BHAR of sample A is significantly different 
from zero, whereas mean BHAR of sample B is not 
significantly different from zero. In month 24 and 
month 36 both subsamples mean BHAR are different 
from zero significantly. Through t-tests, state-owned 
and private-owned listed companies mean BHARs are 
not statistically significant on month 12 and month 24 
while statistically significant in month 36. 
Furthermore, we investigate the differences of 
financial performance between state-holding listed 
firm and private-holding listed firm. We find the mean 
ROA and mean ROE ratio are positive. The private-
holding listed firm is performed much better than the 
state-holding listed firm (ROE ratio is 0.0722 greater 
and ROA ratio is 0.0156 greater). Our results indicate 
the samples have passed the financial performance 
difference t-test. 
 
4.3.2 Multiple regression analysis 
 
Table 5 shows the regression of long-term 
performance after the announcement. Similar to the 
results Table 3 presents, the Gov variable and the 
cross term Inject*Gov is significantly negative in 
Table 5. As Table 3 indicates Inject variable is 
statistically significant in 3 days from day-1 to day+1, 
it is not significant for the long-term performance test. 
Therefore we can conclude that the market 
performance and financial performance of the state-
holding listed firms are worse than the private-holding 
listed firms after the announcement of asset injection. 
Those results support the Hypothesis 2 and in 
accordance to the argument made from the results in 
Table 3.  
Different dependent variables cause differences 
in regression results. Such as Size, it is negative for 
BHAR36 index significantly but positive for ROE 
index significantly. For the growth index Q, it is 
negative for BHAR36 index non-significantly but 
positive for ROE index significantly. 
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Table 5. Long-term performance regression of asset injection 
 
 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 ROE ROE ROE 
C 2.451** 
(2.052) 
3.333** 
（2.509） 
2.505** 
(2.107) 
-0.451** 
(-2.157) 
-0.474** 
(-2.259) 
-0.471** 
(-2.278) 
 -0.274** 
(-2.268) 
-0.273** 
（-2.260） 
 -0.082*** 
(-3.796) 
-0.081*** 
(-3.761) 
 
  -0.867 
（-1.508） 
  0.005 
(1.132) 
 
*    -0.347** 
(-2.368) 
  -0.070*** 
(-2.753) 
 0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
（-0.084） 
0.000 
(-0.014) 
0.000 
(-0.563) 
0.000 
(-0.674) 
0.000 
(-0.967) 
 -0.116** 
(-2.035) 
-0.125** 
（-2.184） 
-0.118** 
(-2.090) 
0.025** 
(2.480) 
0.022** 
(2.078) 
0.023** 
(2.369) 
 -0.215 
（0.151） 
-0.219 
（-1.462） 
-0.214 
(-1.430) 
0.061** 
(2.328) 
0.061** 
(2.348) 
0.081*** 
(3.104) 
 0.125 
(0.357) 
0.119 
（0.340） 
0.111 
(0.318) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.196) 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.043 0.044 0.040 
F值 2.871*** 2.780** 2.966** 4.756*** 4.180*** 4.450*** 
Note: *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.05 level; * statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level 
 
4.3.3 Robustness analysis 
 
In order to verify Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we 
made the short-term market performance, long-term 
market performance and long-term financial 
performance as the dependent variable to conduct a 
regression analysis respectively. The test variables 
Gov index and Inject*Gov index are negative without 
alternating in all set of regression. At the same time, 
our univariate analysis also shows that the asset 
injection performance of state-holding listed 
companies are poorer than that of the private-holding 
listed companies, the evidences above make our 
research conclusion convincible. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The empirical results of this research suggest that the 
shareholders’ wealth and company’s performance 
increase in short-term, but decrease in long-term after 
the announcement of asset injection by major 
shareholder. For asset injections, the state-holding 
listed companies experience larger decline in long-
term shareholders’ wealth and performance than that 
of the private-holding listed companies. 
This study provides following economic 
implications and makes recommendations 
accordingly. First, as the share-split reform is 
completed in China securities market, the conflicts 
between controlling shareholder and non-controlling 
shareholders are about to disappear. However, it does 
not imply a complete elimination of opportunistic 
behaviors of the controlling shareholders to obtain 
self-interests. To restrain controlling shareholders 
from opportunistic behaviors that would damage the 
interests of the non-controlling shareholders, it is 
recommended by this paper that we should improve 
the corporate governance structure and strengthen 
legal supervision.  
Second, notwithstanding the CSRC continues to 
improve the asset restructuring of the listed companies 
documents, M&A documents and other legal 
documents, it cannot completely prevent the 
occurrence of opportunistic behavior of the controlling 
shareholders in PPE by asset injection in China listed 
companies. Therefore, the regulations for assets 
injection of the listed companies in China still need to 
be refined and require further improvement.  
At last, because of the government intervention, 
shareholders’ wealth and corporate performance 
decline after the announcement. Therefore, China 
should speed up the construction of the market 
economy system. Most importantly, China should 
reduce the extent of government intervention from 
both local and national levels.  
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